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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Exploiting Human Perception for Adversarial Attacks
by
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Professor Mani B. Srivastava, Chair
There has been a significant amount of recent work towards fooling deep-learning-based
classifiers, particularly for images, via adversarial inputs that are perceptually similar to
benign examples. However, researchers typically use minimization of the Lp-norm as a proxy
for imperceptibility, an approach that oversimplifies the complexity of real-world images and
human visual perception. We exploit the relationship between image features and human
perception to propose a Perceptual Loss (PL) metric to better capture human imperceptibly
during the generation of adversarial images. By focusing on human perceptible distortion of
image features, the metric yields better visual quality adversarial images as our experiments
validate. Our results also demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our algorithm.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Vulnerability of deep learning model
It has been widely observed that deep neural networks are susceptible to adversarial inputs
([SZS13], [GSS14], [ASC19]). For instance, with a small perturbation added to images, the
image classifiers make completely wrong decision ([GSS14], [BRB17]). What is worse, with
full structures of deep neural networks exposed to attackers ([CW17]), the attack is easy to
perform, and the models can even be forced to make with inconspicuous perturbation.
xorg and xtarget L2+BA PL+BA L2+SignOPT PL+SignOPT
Figure 1.1: Visual comparison at 20k iteration. From left to right, first row: original image and
adversarial images generated using L2 + Boundary Attack ([BRB17]), PL (ours) + Boundary Attack,
L2 + Sign-OPT ([CSC19]), and PL (ours) + Sign-OPT. Second row: image in the targeted class
and zoomed patches of each adversarial image. Our methods (the third column and the fifth column)
can visibly suppress the ghosting effects with the same number of queries.
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1.2 Rethinking adversarial attack
In many attack scenarios, if fooling an AI model has been claimed, the adversarial input
should be subjected to the following main requirements at the same time: i) Deceptive:
the prediction of the perturbed inputs should be modified. ii) Feasible: In many cases or
real-world attack situations, the number of queries to the deep learning model is limited and
the gradient information and even the output logistic or probability are even not exposed to
the attacker. iii) Inconspicuous: Images with unnatural artifacts can be detected by statistical
test and can be sent to human inspection ([MGF17], [GMP17], [MC17]). The unnatural
property can also be used to defend against adversarial attacks by mapping the adversarial
inputs to the natural image space ([GRC17], [TKP17]) and hence, those adversarial attacks
can be relatively easy to defend. Therefore, adversarial images with highly perceivable
perturbations may not be as destructive as inconspicuous one.
Consider the input image x ∈ RN , where N = 3×W ×H is the size of images. The
hard-label classifier gives its predicted label y, where y ∈ {1, ..., C}. Currently, given the
original image xorg, its ground-truth label yorg, a target class t 6= yorg and adversarial image
xadv, one of the commonly used methods for generating an adversarial image is to minimize
the L2-distance:
minimize
xadv∈RN
1
N
‖xadv − xorg‖22 (1.1a)
subject to f(xadv) = t (1.1b)
By minimizing the L2-distance, the attackers intend to make the adversarial images inconspic-
uous from the human perspective such that the harm cannot be easily prevented ([GMP17],
[MGF17]). However, we also raise the question about the validity of L2: is the inconspicu-
ousness automatically satisfied in current adversarial attack tasks by merely minimizing the
L2-norm? To better study the human perception question, we also conduct a subjective test
on various adversarial images which will be discussed in Chapter 2.
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1.3 Contribution
We summarize the contribution of this thesis as follows:
• Subjective test: We conduct a human perception assessment to study the effectiveness
of using Lp-norm in the adversarial attacks and demonstrate certain limitations of these
metrics. These data and statistics may serve as the research material for the vision
community in the future.
• Better visual quality: with the same amount of resources utilized, we are able to achieve
better perceptual quality. In the experiment, we incorporate the Perceptual Loss (PL)
in the hard-label black-box attack setting, which is a practical attack scenario.
• Novel feature distortion metric: Perceptual Loss (PL) is a metric of low-level image
feature distortion based on human perception. It is adaptive to image context and does
not rely on optimization methods.
• Robust classifier of low-level features: edge, texture, and smooth area. The classification
is unsupervised with pixel-level distinction.
3
CHAPTER 2
Human perception assessment
2.1 Experiment setup
We use Amazon Mechanical Turk to conduct the human perception assessment, where we
recruited 165 subjects. We designed a website that serves as the user interface where users
are requested to evaluate adversarial images one by one. Some of the presented images are
the original ones as captured by a camera, and others have noise added to them to fool an
AI algorithm. Subjects were asked to give their opinions by answering whether the image
has been perturbed by an adversary to fool an AI algorithm. In this human perception
evaluation, we generated adversarial examples of 20 images using several different methods.
Firstly, we use L0, Linf , and L2 as the objective function and optimizing them with genetic
algorithm ([ASC19]). The reason we choose to use the genetic algorithm in [ASC19] is that
it is a zero-order optimization approach that is easy to implement and adaptive to various
optimization problems. Besides, we also follow the setting in Boundary Attack ([BRB17]) to
optimize L2 objective function. We sampled adversarial images at different iterations, and
each time, the subject was asked to evaluate one image by answering whether the image
is perturbed. We asked 165 subjects to evaluate benign images and adversarial images at
different iterations obtained by the four different combinations of attack methods and attack
objectives. Each subject can see 24 to 25 images. There are 800 adversarial examples, and
20 benign images in total and each of them is evaluated by five times.
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2.2 Are these attacks really imperceptible?
Denote that p ∈ P where p is a specific attack, i.e., GenAttack + L0 and P is the set
of the attack methods. Explicitly, P = {GenAttack + L0,GenAttack + L2,GenAttack +
Linf ,Boundary Attack+L2}. The ratio of a method rtp at a specific iteration t was calculated
by:
rtp =
1
5|Sp|
5∑
j=1
∑
i∈Sp
1{xti is considered as adversarial at iteration t evaluated at time j}
(2.1)
where 1{·} is an indicator function, j denotes that the time when the image xti is evaluated, t
denotes the iteration where we sample adversarial images, and Sp denotes the set of adversarial
images generate by attack method p. In the following figures, we will plot how the ratio rtp
changes with respect to iterations. We treat the ratio rtp as a proxy of the human perception
on adversarial images.
Typically, we also calculate the ratio rˆ denoting how human perceive the benign images:
rˆ =
1
5|Sˆ|
5∑
j=1
∑
i∈Sˆ
1{xi is considered as adversarial evaluated at time j} (2.2)
where Sˆ denotes the set of benign images. Therefore, by comparing how rtp changes across
different iteration t with rˆ, we approximate how human perception changes with respect to
iterations. Note that rˆ will remain constant across every iteration since the benign images do
not change during the optimization. Therefore, it plays the role of an indication of whether
the adversarial image is indistinguishable from the benign images.
From Figure. 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7, we can have several observations: i) Using Lp-norm as the
objective can generally improve the human perception quality. As we can observed from the
figures, the ratio rtp is generally increasing. ii) However, when we consider the preference of
human, Lp-norm cannot always represents it. For instance, from Figure. 2.6 we know that in
terms of L2-norm, GenAttack + L2 is significantly better than Boundary Attack + L2. But
from the human perspective, they are comparable across iterations.
From the human perception evaluation, we can conclude that commonly use Lp distance
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is valid but not perfect. Minimizing the Lp-norm used in the above attack methods can
generally improve image quality. However, it cannot completely represent the preference of
human perceptions. From Fig. 2.6 we can verify that even though GenAttack+L2 significantly
outperforms Boundary Attack + L2 and other optimization methods in L2 distance, their
perceptual quality does not always give the same results. If we merely treat the L2 distance as
the proxy of human perception, the GenAttack+L2 should have behaved the best among the
four attack methods in human perception. But clearly from Figure. 2.5, this is not the case.
Therefore, if the goal of attackers is to make injected noise imperceptible, spending resources
in minimizing Lp-norm may not always be the optimal choice. This claim is also supported
by the user studies of adversarial images in [SBR18] and [SZM19], where they demonstrate
certain mismatches between Lp-norm and human perception. In the following chapters, we
will discuss an alternative Perceptual Loss metric to better capture the relationship of human
perception and perturbation using our novel image feature classification algorithm.
6
Figure 2.1: GenAttack + L0 Figure 2.2: GenAttack + Linf
Figure 2.3: GenAttack + L2 Figure 2.4: Boundary Attack + L2
Figure 2.5: Results of perception assessment: ratio that human think the given image is adversarial.
The black horizontal line denotes the ratio of benign images. Note that from the human perspective,
Boundary Attack + L2 performs the best among the four methods since when iteration becomes
larger than 50k, subjects cannot almost distinguish the adversarial images from the benign images
(Fig. 2.4).
7
Figure 2.6: Results of perception assessment. Left: L2-norm changes v.s. iterations. Right: Ratio
that human recognize the image as an adversary; BA: Boundary Attack; GA: GenAttack. According
to the L2 criterion, GenAttack + L2 is the best, and the Boundary + L2 and GenAttack + L0 are
comparable, which are not the case of human perception as is reflected in the right.
original original GA+ L2 GA+ L2 BA+ L2 BA+ L2
Figure 2.7: Mismatch between L2-norm and visual quality. From left to right: the first pair: original
image; the second pair: GenAttack (L2-distance: 2.8e−4); the third pair: Boundary Attack (L2-
distance: 7.8e−4). The second pair contains color distortion at the neck of the squirrel even though
its L2-distance is smaller. Therefore, it implies that L2 cannot always give the best representation
of human perception.
8
CHAPTER 3
Related work
Adversarial attack Some attack methods consider the white-box setting, where the clas-
sifier is completely exposed to the attackers. Among them, C&W attack [CW17] reformulate
the objective function into an unconstrained optimization problem using the logistic outputs
of classifiers. Besides, [CZS17] and [ASC19] consider the black-box scenario where only the
output logistic or classification probability is unknown to the attacker. Furthermore, [IEA18],
[BRB17], [CLC18], and [CSC19] consider more extreme cases, hard-label black-box attack,
where only the top-1 or top-k hard label is given to the attackers.
Objective function [SBR18] demonstrate that Lp-norm may not be the optimal measure-
ment in adversarial setting by conducting user studies. They study human perception by
asking humans to predict the ground-truth label of corrupted images. Moreover, a recent
work [SZM19] asked subjects to point out the perturbed image when they think it became just
noticeably different from the original image. This claim is also supported by the user studies
of adversarial images in [SBR18] and [SZM19], where they demonstrate certain mismatches
between Lp-norm and human perception.
The Perceptual Loss metrics have been used in many areas, such as audio codec and image
processing, to capture the properties of human perception. Leveraging the same ideas, there
are some existing works trying to generate adversarial images to improve visual quality. Some
methods strive to generate adversarial inputs by shifting the color space ([HP18]), performing
geometric transform of the original image ([ETS17]), or using generative models learned
from the data manifold ([ZDS17]). These methods may produce adversarial examples with
high distance to the original images as denoted by Lp-norm. Furthermore, other methods
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are trying to improve upon the Lp distance: [CH19] combine L0 and L∞ to produce sparser
and less perceivable noise. [GMP19] aims to preserve the perceptual quality by maximizing
the Structural Similarity (SSIM) between original images and adversarial images. [ZAF19]
further includes the smoothness penalty into the objective function to smooth noise on the flat
areas of the input image using Laplacian Smoothing. Besides, [ZLL19] propose an objective
function of color distance in CIELCH space to reduce visible artifacts. Among them, [LLW18]
is probably the most similar to ours: they computed local variance and tried to perturb pixels
at high variance zones. However, they treat features equally across images and only perform
attacks in white-box settings. In this work, we propose a more adaptive and accurate metric
that is closely connected to human perception and demonstrate an improved visual quality in
realistic cases, such as the hard-label black-box attack scenario.
10
CHAPTER 4
Background & algorithm
In this chapter, we mainly focus on the relationship between human perception and image
contexts. We first list the ingredients that influence the human perceptual system and then
design a novel pixel-wise Fourier-Argand (FA) classifier to discriminate the image samples
based on the perceptual sensitivity adaptively. Then we demonstrate that the optimality and
high efficiency of the FA classifier theoretically ensure the reliability and effectiveness of the
proposed framework. Exploiting the feature classifier, we finally propose a novel perceptual
loss and develop an efficient adversarial attack algorithm.
4.1 Human perceptual system
The human visual evaluation mechanism is a quite sophisticated system related to many
aspects, e.g., image resolution, object types, image contrast, etc ([WSL19]). In the image and
video processing community, one widely accepted conclusion is that the human evaluation
mechanism largely depends on the frequency domain characteristics of the image ([DD90]).
For instance, people leverage frequency sensitivity in JPEG image format where 10 : 1
compression is achieved with little perceptible loss in image quality ([Hai92], [HLN18]).
However, based on the Parseval’s theorem (4.1), we know that minimizing L2 distance is
equivalent to penalizing frequency components X[k] with equal importance:
N−1∑
n=0
x[n]2 =
1
N
N−1∑
k=0
|X[k]|2 (4.1)
Therefore, the widely used L2 norm process the image frequency components indiscrim-
inately, which is far from the truth of visual perception. This motivates us to develop a
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metric that can better characterize the human perceptual evaluation. Since the perceptual
evaluation is subjective and variables affecting visual quality are complicated, we provide
a perspective that explicitly characterizes human perception by exploiting low-level image
features (e.g., edges, textures, etc.). The motivation behind is that, although the precise
characterization of the human perceptual evaluation is infeasible, the link between the visual
sensitivity of the human eye and image features is relatively clear and well-studied ([BSD09],
[RBM19], [PIM08], [DHL15]). Basically, given an image, people tend to be more sensitive to
the low-variation features instead of edges and ridges ([DD90]). Generally speaking, people
usually divide the low-level features of the image into three categories: smooth areas, edges,
and textures. This actually provides a clue to quantify the perceptual distortion of an
adversarial image: compute the feature distortion based on the visual sensitivity, which is
the core idea of this work.
4.2 Refined feature classification
As is mentioned above, we divide the low-level features of the image into three categories:
smooth areas, edges, and textures. Hence, we propose a novel low-level feature classification
(FA classifier) based on the recent Fourier-Argand (FA) filter ([ZB20]). The reason for
not using traditional edge detectors or deep-learning based approaches is that general edge
detectors can only handle the classification of low-frequency and high-frequency components,
and the deep-learning approaches are not robust due to the diversity of the real images. In
contrast, we demonstrate that the optimality and high-efficiency of FA classifier guarantee its
accuracy and robustness. In the first step, we use the FA filter to distinguish smooth areas
and fast-variation features based on the response. Then, we further discriminate between the
edges and textures through the feature spatial sparsity and direction.
In essence, low-level features characterize the local directionality of the image, e.g., edges
are usually unidirectional, while textures are usually multidirectional. This requires that
the edge-detector used should be able to capture all possible directional changes, i.e., [0, 2pi).
However, it is very difficult to balance the accuracy and complexity: either we achieve finer
12
reef patch FA response smooth area edge texture
Figure 4.1: Example of FA classifier. From left to right: reef image, a zoomed patch, and the
corresponding features generated by the FA classifier. The bright regions are features detected. The
difference of edge and texture is the sparsity of the neighboring FA responses.
angle discretization with expensive computational cost, or we keep low complexity by rougher
angle discretization, such as Canny edge-detector ([Can86]).
In order to address this issue, people propose steerable filters ([FA91]) whose space of
all rotated version is finite as long as the steerability assumption is satisfied. Using a linear
combination of basis filters ([FA91]), they can obtain an approximated version of the original
filter which is rotation invariant. This rotation-invariance guarantee is still missing in deep-
learning based methods. However, this filter approximation in [FA91] is still not perfect. The
polynomial representation used in the paper lacks optimality and robustness in the presence
of noise. Moreover, it causes numerical stability problems and results in high computational
cost, making it difficult to represent fine direction-selective filters.
Fourier-Argand filter Recently, people further develop Fourier-Agrand (FA) filter, which
is highly efficient and optimal in terms of the approximation error ([ZB20]). The key idea
of the FA filter is to find the optimal basis consisting of N functions for approximating
all rotated versions of the given pattern. Here, the pattern is a filter which can accurately
capture the image spatial variation along certain direction. Specifically, let αh denote the
pattern characterized by the direction α (α ∈ [0, 2pi]), and {φ0, φ1, · · · , φN−1} be an arbitrary
basis of N elements. Let P{·} denote the orthogonal projection onto the approximation
space span{φ0, φ1, · · · , φN−1}. [ZB20] found the optimal basis for all rotated versions of αh
13
by minimizing the average approximation error eN :
eN
def
=
∫ 2pi
0
‖αh− P{αh}‖22 dα (4.2)
Low-level feature classification This minimization automatically leads to the optimal
and rotation-invariant Fourier-Argand basis. The optimality ensures that we can use a few
basis to approximate the pattern accurately. Furthermore, the rotation-invariance ensures
that the Fourier-Argand filter can fully characterize all spatial directions without any angle
quantization error. The properties provide a valid and efficient tool to accurately classify the
fast-variation image samples with small complexity. We refer to this paper ([ZB20]) for more
details if readers are interested.
With the FA response, the next question is how to further discriminate the edge and
texture features from the filtered results. The key idea is based on the following observation:
intuitively, the spatial sparsity of the texture features in the FA response is much higher than
the edge features.
The sparsity criterion provides a valid approach to effectively classify the edge and texture
features based on the FA response FA(xi,j). Suppose µ1, µ2, and µ3 denote three human
perception coefficients corresponding to smooth area, edge, and texture respectively, and 1{·}
is an indicator function. We first define a sparsity function g(xi,j) to characterize the sparsity
of FA response within a local patch Bi,j centered at pixel xi,j:
Bi,j :
def
= {xm,n | i− r0 ≤ m ≤ i+ r0 and j − r0 ≤ n ≤ j + r0} (4.3)
g(xi,j) =
1
|Bi,j|
∑
xm,n∈Si,j
1{FA(xm,n)>σ} (4.4)
where 1{·} will indicate the FA responses that are above threshold σ. Hence g(xi,j) will
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compute, within the patch Bi,j, the ratio of the response.
Mi,j =

µ1, FA(xi,j) < σ
µ2, FA(xi,j) > σ and g(xi,j) 6 s0
µ3, otherwise
(4.5)
Figure 4.2: FA-filter based feature classification (Eqn. 4.5). For a pixel xi,j , it will be first classified
by the magnitude of FA(·). A high-FA-response pixel will be further classified according to the
neighboring FA sparsity (Eqn. 4.4)
Mi,j indicates the sensitivity coefficient of pixel xi,j. Essentially, the procedure of classifi-
cation is that if the FA response is smaller than a certain threshold, the pixel is classified
into the smooth area; If not, a pixel will be classified into texture if the FA response is dense
within a local patch. Otherwise will be classified into edge if the response is sparse (as is
indicated by Fig. 4.2).
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4.3 Perceptual loss formulation & algorithm
Perceptual loss Hence, according to the our discussion in above sections, we propose the
the problem formulation and the Perceptual Loss (PL) as follows:
minimize
xadv∈RN
PL(xorg,xadv) (4.6a)
subject to f(xadv) = t (4.6b)
where
PL(xorg,xadv) :
def
=
1
N
||xorg M− xadv M||22 and t 6= yorg (4.7)
The notation  denotes the Hadamard product of matrices. PL strives to distinguish the
significance across image features and assign penalties to them accordingly.
Proposed algorithm We leverage Boundary Attack, a decision-based method ([BRB17]),
and give the attack procedures as follows (We also described how to use Sign-OPT Attack
[CSC19] to find adversarial samples in the supplementary materials). In essence, Boundary
Attack is to perform searches along the decision boundary. In each iteration, the method will
sample noise η and project xi + η onto the sphere centered at xorg with radius d(xorg,xi)
(Eqn. 4.8). And then it makes a small step towards xorg with step size βd(xorg,xi), (Eqn.
4.9). We refer our readers to [BRB17] for details. In our case, the distance function
d(xorg,xi) = ‖(xorg − xi)M‖2
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Algorithm 1 PL + Boundary Attack
1: Given original image xorg, image in the target class xtarget, hard-label black-box classifier
f(x) : RN → {0, 1, ..., C}
2: Generate M ∈ RN according to (4.2). Initial step size γ and β. Let x1 = xtarget
3: for i = 1 : N0 do
4: Generate random noise η ∈ RN and project it such that 〈η,xorg − xi〉 = 0
5: i) Perform orthogonal step:
xi+1o = x
org +
1√
1 + γ2
(γ
‖(xorg − xi)M‖2
‖η M‖2 η − (x
org − xi)) (4.8)
6: ii) Perform step towards original image:
xi+1 = xi+1o + βM (xorg − xi+1o ) (4.9)
7: if xi+1 is not adversarial then
8: xi+1 = xi
9: Increase γ and β if the attack success rate is too high. Otherwise, decrease them.
10: return xi+1
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CHAPTER 5
Experimental results
5.1 Quantitative evaluation
Experiment setup We first randomly generate 50 image pairs from ImageNet test dataset
([DDS09]). Then we use Sign-OPT in [CSC19] and Boundary Attack in [BRB17] to optimize
the loss function. Experiments are conducted on three different network architectures:
Inception ([SVI16]), ResNet-50, and ResNet-101 ([HZR16]). We mainly focus on the targeted
black-box attack setting, where the initial samples are the images that are correctly classified
as the targeted class by the classifiers. Besides, µ1, µ2, and µ3 in (Eqn. 4.5) are set to 1, 0.3,
and 0.5 respectively. r0 is 1/10 of the width of input images and s0 equals to 0.4.
In the experiments, each input image is normalized to [−0.5, 0.5]. PL and L2-norm are
calculated as we mentioned in (4.6) and (4.7). Also, we mainly use median distortion as
the metric. median distortion for x queries is the median adversarial perturbation across all
examples under a specific metric, i.e., L2-norm.
We can have the following observations: i) The total perturbation across PL and L2-norm
are comparable. However, by using PL to guide noise according to image features, we can
assign noise to pixels based on the spatial distribution of image features. ii) PL is compatible
with different network architectures and different optimization methods. iii) Compared to
the original attack metric, PL can achieve better visual quality by suppressing unpleasant
artifacts, such as ghosting effects.
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Figure 5.1: Performance v.s. iteration. The first row: PL; Second row: L2. From left to right,
experiments are conducted on Inception-v3, ResNet-50, and ResNet-101 network architectures on
ImageNet.
5.2 Human perception evaluation
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods, we further conducted human perception
evaluation among 21 volunteers. We prepared 20 attack images and generated the corre-
sponding adversarial images using L2 and PL metric by querying the models 20k times. We
present a subject with the original image and adversarial images generated by two different
metrics together. Subjects are asked to evaluate which adversarial image looks closer to
the original one. The information of attack methods is hidden from the subjects, and the
questions can only be answered by looking at the image quality.
Preference PL L2 Cannot determine
# (ratio) 219 (52.1%) 71 (16.9%) 130 (31.0%)
Table 5.2: Human evaluation results
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Attack Inception-v3 ResNet-50 ResNet-101
queries L2 PL queries L2 PL queries L2 PL
L2+BA
10k 1.0e−2 8.0e−3 10k 1.0e−2 8.4e−3 10k 7.2e−3 5.8e−3
20k 5.0e−3 4.1e−3 20k 5.0e−3 4.3e−3 20k 3.9e−3 3.2e−3
40k 1.5e−3 1.4e−3 40k 2.2e−3 1.9e−3 40k 1.5e−3 1.3e−3
PL+BA
10k 1.4e−2 6.7e−3 10k 1.4e−2 7.3e−3 10k 1.3e−2 6.0e−3
20k 6.1e−3 2.5e−3 20k 7.8e−3 3.0e−3 20k 6.1e−3 2.6e−3
40k 3.1e−3 7.1e−4 40k 4.1e−3 1.1e−3 40k 3.0e−3 8.4e−4
L2+SignOPT
10k 3.5e−3 2.9e−3 10k 4.9e−3 4.0e−3 10k 3.4e−3 2.8e−3
20k 1.5e−3 1.2e−3 20k 1.5e−3 1.2e−3 20k 1.2e−3 1.0e−3
40k 3.8e−4 3.2e−4 40k 6.8e−4 5.6e−4 40k 3.8e−4 3.1e−4
PL+SignOPT
10k 4.0e−3 2.0e−3 10k 4.4e−3 2.1e−3 10k 4.2e−3 2.3e−3
20k 1.4e−3 5.3e−4 20k 1.8e−3 4.6e−4 20k 1.3e−3 4.3e−4
40k 4.0e−4 9.0e−5 40k 5.5e−4 1.5e−4 40k 4.7e−4 1.0e−4
Table 5.1: Algorithm performance comparison. Column: objective function + attack method. Row:
different evaluating metric. Using the same optimization method, our results are better in terms of
PL metric and even comparable in L2 metric.
As is shown in the table 5.2, among 420 responses, there are 52% answers indicate
the adversarial examples generated using PL are closer to the original image, which is
significantly larger than 16.9% using L2. Besides, 31% of the responses indicate that they
cannot distinguish a better adversarial image. Our interpretation is that: i) Some images
have too few high variant features such as edges and texture so that our metric essentially
regresses to L2. ii) Due to the input size of classifiers, images are restricted to relatively low
resolution, making details difficult to be identified. Nevertheless, those responses do indicate
that our methods are not degrading the visual quality.
5.3 Conclusion
In this work, we propose a new metric, perceptual loss, for adversarial attack based on
low-level image features for better perceptual quality. The metric relies on our novel low-level
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Figure 5.2: Visualization of experimental results. First row: PL (ours); Second row: L2-distance.
From left to right: adversarial image, a zoomed patch, the corresponding noise, zoomed noise patch.
Our method can effectively reduce the ghosting artifacts within the red box.
feature classifier and is compatible with different optimization methods. With the total
distortion amount (L2) comparable, our method can smartly change noise distribution to
improve human perceptual quality, which is also verified by our human perception evaluation.
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Figure 5.3: Visualization of experimental results. First row: PL (ours); Second row: L2-distance.
From left to right: adversarial image, a zoomed patch, the corresponding noise, zoomed noise patch.
Our method can effectively reduce the ghosting artifacts that appear on the back of the sea lion.
Figure 5.4: Visualization of experimental results. First row: PL+Sign-OPT; Second row: L2+Sign-
OPT. From left to right: adversarial images at 5k, 10k, 15k, 20k. Notice the strong watermark in
the background using L2 metric.
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APPENDIX A
Optimized using Sign-OPT
In this chapter, we discuss how we utilized the optimization method in Sign-OPT ([CSC19])
to minimize the Perceptual Loss (PL). Note that the function g(θ) is formulated in [CSC19]
and [CLC18], which essentially describe how good a perturbation θ is.
Algorithm 2 PL + Sign-OPT
1: Given original image xorg, image xtarget in the target class t, hard-label black-box classifier
f(x) : RN → {0, 1, ..., C}
2: Define function g(θ) :def= min.λ>0 s.t. f(xorg + λ θ||θM ||) = t
3: Generate M ∈ RN according to the procedures described in the paper. Let θ0 =
xtarget − xorg
4: for i = 0 : N0 do
5: Generate random noise η1,η2, · · · ,ηQ ∈ RN from Gaussian or Uniform distribution
6: for q = 1 : Q do
7: ηq ← (ηq  1M)2
8: Compute ∇gˆ(θi) = 1Q
∑Q
q=1 sign(g(θi + ηq)− g(θi)) · ηq
9: Choose an appropriate step size γ using line search
10: Update θi+1 = θi − γ∇gˆ(θi)
11: return xorg + θi+1
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APPENDIX B
Adversarial image visualization
Figure B.1: From left to right: adversarial images at 5k, 10k, 15k, 20k. First row: PL+Sign-OPT;
Second row: L2+Sign-OPT
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Figure B.2: From left to right: adversarial images at 5k, 10k, 15k, 20k. First row: PL+Sign-OPT;
Second row: L2+Sign-OPT
Figure B.3: From left to right: adversarial images at 5k, 10k, 15k, 20k. First row: PL +Sign-OPT;
Second row: L2+Sign-OPT
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Figure B.4: From left to right: adversarial images at 5k, 10k, 15k, 20k. First row: PL+Sign-OPT;
Second row: L2+Sign-OPT
Figure B.5: From left to right: adversarial images at 5k, 10k, 15k, 20k. First row: PL+Sign-OPT;
Second row: L2+Sign-OPT
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Figure B.6: From left to right: adversarial images at 5k, 10k, 15k, 20k. First row: PL+Sign-OPT;
Second row: L2+Sign-OPT
Figure B.7: From left to right: adversarial images at 5k, 10k, 15k, 20k. First row: L2+Sign-OPT;
Second row: PercLoss+Sign-OPT
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Figure B.8: From left to right: adversarial images at 5k, 10k, 15k, 20k. First row: L2+Sign-OPT;
Second row: PercLoss+Sign-OPT
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